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SECURITY-CHATI'EL MORTGAGES-MORTGAGE RECORDED UNDER FEDERAL
AVIATION Ac:r OF 1958 As A.FFEc:rED BY STATE LAws-Defendant, a Michigan
corporation, ordered a new airplane from Air-O-Fleet, a retailer. Air-OFleet financed its purchase from the manufacturer through a loan from
plaintiff, a Texas corporation, who took a chattel mortgage on the airplane. One day after Air-O-Fleet had made delivery to defendant and
received full payment, plaintiff recorded the chattel mortgage with the
Federal Aviation Authority in accordance with the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, section 1403, which provides that "no conveyance or instrument ...
shall be valid ••. against any person other than the person by whom the
conveyance or other instrument is made or given, ... or any person having
actual notice thereof, until such conveyance is filed for recordation in the
office of the Administrator.'' 1 Air-O-Fleet became bankrupt, and plaintiff
filed suit against the defendant to recover the airplane or, in the alternative,
the amount owing on the mortgage. On a motion by the plaintiff for summary judgment,2 held, denied. Since the conveyance to defendant preceded
recordation of the mortgage, defendant took absolute title to the airplane
unless he had actual notice of the mortgage. Even upon a trial determination that the defendant had actual notice, if the mortgage were otherwise
void as to defendant under state law, federal recording would not save
it.3 Aircraft Investment Corp. v. Pezzani b Reid Equipment Co., 205 F.
Supp. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
1 72 Stat. 806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (Supp. III, 1961). Section 1403(d) of the
act provides that "each conveyance or other instrument recorded by means of or under
the system provided for in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall from the time of
its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without further or other recordation."
The effect of this section is to make constructive notice effective at the time of filing,
thereby removing the possibility of a bona fide purchase between filing and recordation,
as occurred in Anderson v. Triair Associates, Inc., 1949 U.S. Av. 440 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1947).
See Kerley Chem. Corp. v. Colboch, 145 Cal. App. 2d 509, 302 P.2d 621 (1956).
2 Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without an offering of proof of actual
notice appears to have been made in the belief that defendant's failure to record,
or plaintiff's prior recording, precluded all other considerations. This involves a
characterization of § 1403 as a "race" statute-a notion which seems erroneous on
the face of the statute and is unsupported by authority. See Bishop v. R. S. Evans,
East Point Inc., 80 Ga. App. 324, 56 S.E.2d lll4 (1949).
3 The court referred to the possibility that defendant's reliance on the conduct
of plaintiff created a waiver of the mortgage lien. See Fidelity Corp. v. Associates Discount Corp., 340 Mich. 610, 66 N.W.2d 235 (1954); Coleman Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Mahan,
168 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (mortgage stated that Texas law would govern
all rights under the instrument). The court also mentioned the possible application
of a Texas statute (TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. art. 4000 (1948)], which makes void a chattel
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The significance of this decision is in its rejection of the view that
compliance with section 1403 of the federal act is the sole criterion for the
validity of an aircraft mortgage. The court specifically stated that the
federal enactment did not pre-empt the field of aircraft conveyancing,
holding that the plaintiff must also contend with state law relating to
conveyances, e.g., waiver of lien, estoppel to assert prior mortgage, which
might protect the defendant from a claim under the mortgage, as well as
the defense available under section 1403 that he had no actual notice
of the prior interest. The apparent conflict of this decision with dicta
in In re Veterans' Air Express Co. 4 poses the difficult problem of defining
the scope of federal regulation of aircraft conveyancing and determining
if, and to what extent, state law remains applicable.
The court in Veterans' Air Express was primarily concerned with the
question whether the recording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act
could be made applicable to a Government mortgage on an aircraft
.operated solely in intrastate commerce. In upholding the constitutionality
of such an application,5 the court thereby held the Government's federally
recorded lien senior to a mechanic's lien for repairs accomplished after
the recording,6 and in dictum observed that Congress had "pre-empted"
the entire field of aircraft conveyancing. This concept of "pre-emption"
is subject to several interpretations. One possible meaning could be that
Congress had nullified the effect of state law upon interests in aircraft
by providing exclusive procedures in relation to such conveyances.7 A
more reasonable interpretation of Veterans' Air Express, however, would
appear to be that the term "pre-empt," as there used, refers to the conclusive seniority of Government liens,8 an interpretation more in keeping
with the court's emphasis upon the power of Congress to accord seniority
to federal liens. This concept of "pre-emption" found strong support in
the congressional hearings on the original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.9
There it was stressed that, because of the increasing use of federal loans for
mortgage on goods "daily exposed for sale" regardless of actual notice to the purchaser.
See City Bank v. Phillips, 190 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1951); see also Donahue Inv. Co. v.
H. E. McMasters Co., 301 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948).
In reaching this decision, the court recognized the practical necessity of regulating
intrastate aircraft interests in order to effectuate interstate policy. This view is supported by United States v. Darby L.umber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941,); NLRB v. Jones &:
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Accord, Dawson v. General Discount Corp.,
82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950); Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610
(1949). Contra, Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardner, 174 Misc. 798, 22 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 1248 (1948); 10 u. Prrr. L. REv. 79 (1948).
6 When the different sequences of recording and lien accrual are considered, the
cases are easily distinguishable on their facts; therefore, the conflict does not go beyond the dicta in Veterans' Air Express.
7 See Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950).
8 See Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. Am L. &: CoM. 193, 203 (1958).
9 See Hearings on H.R. 9738 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 406 (1938) (hereinafter cited as Hearings).
4
5
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aircraft financing under the Reconstruction Finance Act, it was necessary
to protect Government mortgage liens by means of a central recording
system. Furthermore, in the later case of United States v. United Aircraft
Corp., 10 the court mentioned in dicta that the only basis for federal lien
supremacy appeared to be the need for protection of Government property from the crippling effect of private liens; hence, where the Government is a mere security holder, it should be subject to the same rules
of validity and priority applicable to any other party. This language not
only qualifies the broad assertion of federal pre-emption in Veterans' Air
Express, but apparently recognizes the vitality of state law regarding the
validity of security interests as well as the relative priority of various
interests in the presence of federal recordation. 11
Another interpretation of Veterans' Air Express, one which serves to
reconcile it with the principal case, would be that Congress has only substituted a federally-determined set of priorities for the order presently in
force according to state law, nevertheless leaving intact all of the related
doctrines which affect the priority structure. The purpose of federal recordation was to provide prospective purchasers with nationwide notice
of asserted claims against aircraft.12 This notice provision was responsive
to the fact that the extreme mobility of aircraft had made recording in
the state of purchase insufficient to inform adequately, rather than to a
desire for uniform rules of conveyancing or priority. 13 To require, as does
the principal case, that a conveyance or security interest be valid under
the related state doctrines of estoppel or waiver before it can be protected
by federal recording does not defeat the purpose of providing notice; it
merely gives the purchaser who has such constructive notice a right to
claim the invalidity of the prior interest by virtue of these related doctrines.
Nor is this a departure from the philosophy of state recording systems,
which deny validity to a mortgage which fails to meet other substantive
requirements. 14 Therefore, apart from the possibility of a legislative intent
to protect Government liens, it seems clear that the federal act was meant
only to provide notice on a nationwide scale, leaving the states free to
enforce additional requirements for the validity of conveyances or the
priority of certain types of liens.
It is conceded that Congress, under its power to regulate interstate
commerce, could exclusively regulate every phase of aviation. 15 In the regulation of passenger and freight airline competition, and the enforcement
80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948).
See Scott, supra note 8, at 203-04.
12 See Marshall v. Bardin, 169 Kan. 534, 220 P.2d 187 (1950).
13 Hearings 407.
14 See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § II2 (2d ed. 1936). It jg clear that state
recordation systems were made inapplicable to interests in aircraft by the establishment of a centralized federal system.
lli See note 5 supra.
10
11
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of safety requirements, it has exercised this power. 16 However, in view
of the purpose of central recording, and the limited provisions enacted
to effectuate it, a similar pre-emption does not appear to have been intended with respect to the law relating generally to all aspects of aircraft
conveyancing. To allow such a pre-emption would be to abrogate the
great volume of state statutory and common-law doctrines which relate
to conveyancing of aircraft in favor of the simple rule that conveyances
or instruments eligible for recordation under section 1403(a) and duly
recorded under section I403(c) are inviolable. 11 Although individual state
recording procedures would seem inconsistent with, and hence pre-empted
by, the nationwide notice provisions of section 1403, it would appear that
Congress could not have intended such circumscribed regulatory provisions to operate as the exclusive means of determining rights under aircraft conveyances. Also, hearings incident to the enactment of the Civil
Aeronautics Act and the regulations promulgated under it support the
conclusion that Congress intended to provide an additional requirement,
not an exclusive procedure, for conveyancing of interests in aircraft. 18
The problem of reconciling state law with federal recordation requirements, as seen regarding the validity of security interests in the principal
case, has also arisen as to the question of priorities among interests preferred under state statute or common law and antecedent federally-recorded
interests. At one extreme is the view of strict pre-emption proposed by
Veterans' Air Express, whereby a federally-recorded lien is given priority
over all other security interests; 19 at the other are decisions which subordinate a federally-recorded interest by applying related common-law
doctrines which prefer repairmen's liens20 or equitable titles.21 Several
states continue to enforce statutes granting priority to municipal airport
or repairmen's liens over all other interests, presumably including those
recorded under the Federal Aviation Act.22 The absence of uniformity
in theory and application reflected by the cases would seem to be attributable not to a judicial distaste for federal regulation but rather to a substantial lack of guidance from the provisions of the federal recordation
statute. No different is the problem of the validity of conveyances en16 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 1381, 1421, 72 Stat. 769, 54 Stat. 1235 (1940),
49 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1421 (Supp. III, 1961).
11 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 1403(a), (c), 72 Stat. 806, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1403(a), (c)
(Supp. III, 1961).
18 Hearings 407. 14 C.F.R. § 503.1 n.l (1962) (recordation of aircraft ownership)
provides that "recordation of an instrument does not mean the instrument does, in fact,
affect title to, or any interest in, an aircraft." See also United States v. United Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948).
19 See also United States v. All Am. Airways, Inc., 180 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1950);
Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950).
20 See United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948).
21 See Marshall v. Bardin, 169 Kan. 534, 220 P.2d 187 (1950); see also Anderson v.
Triair Associates, Inc., 1949 U.S. Av. 440 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1947).
22 Scott, supra note 8, at 207. See ALA. CoDE tit. 4, § 29 (1958); ME. R.Ev. STAT.
ANN. ch. 178, § 62 (1954).
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countered in the principal case; in each setting it would appear that, if
state law were made irrelevant to such determinations, there would remain
a body of law quite inadequate to deal with the entirety of conveyancing
problems. Noting the express provision for certain priorities in the Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920,23 a plausible analogical argument could be made
that, by the absence of similar provision in the Federal Aviation Act,
congressional intent not to modify existing priority rules was indicated.
If the theory of absolute "pre-emption" is rejected, as it should be, the
question remains as to the proper relationship between section 1403 and
state law affecting priorities of interests in aircraft. The best solution,
from the standpoint of national uniformity, would be an amendment to
section 1403 whereby definite and detailed provision would be made concerning priorities; 24 such legislation would necessarily preclude the application of any state law whatsoever to priority questions. It would also
produce the incidental advantage of certainty by obviating the need for
recourse to divergent conflict of laws rules. Until such federal legislative
action is forthcoming, however, it would seem reasonable to characterize
section 1403 as a notice provision to be invoked for the protection of
bona fide purchasers of interests in aircraft, rather than as establishing
a preference in complete abrogation of established state law. 25 Although
the principal case is concerned only with the implications of constructive
notice under federal recording as it affects validity of a mortgage interest,
the theory of concurrent state and federal authority which it proposes
should be a basic consideration of the courts, in cases where competing
interests in aircraft are asserted, in arriving at some reasonable priority
structure.
William C. Brashares

23 41 Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1958). See also GILMORE &: BLACK, THE LAw
ADMIRALTY § 9-68 (1957).
24 It is suggested by Scott, supra note 8, at 210, that a provision similar to UNIFORM
CoMl\lERCrAL CoDE § 9-310 would achieve the most acceptable priority structure.
25 The only instance in which the federal recording statute essentially determines
priority is where a security holder has failed to record his interest before a bona fide
conveyance is made. As in the principal case, the security interest would be extinguished,
See Scott, supra note 8, at 204.
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